Paul De Grauwe hat sein Konzept selbst öfters in entsprechenden Artikeln erläutert. Hier habt ihr zum Beispiel einen recht guten Artikel von Paul De Grauwe in “Social Europa Journal” vom 9.3.2012 mit dem Titel “The ECB still has to become the Lender of last Resort“.
In diesem Artikel bemerkt Paul De Grauwe unter anderem: “What can a trillion Euros buy these days? Not a lot if you are the European Central Bank (ECB), which administers monetary policy for the 17 Eurozone member states. In December last year the Bank injected massive amounts of liquidity into the Eurozone banking system, €489 billion. Then, at the end of February this year the ECB created another €529 billion to help out the banking system. There can be little doubt that these injections were necessary to prevent a liquidity squeeze from bringing down the banking system.
As always when central banks use their ‘lender of last resort’ function one hears loud complaints that these operations will lead to ‘moral hazard’ risk, i.e. that banks will have incentives to take on more risk, preparing the road to the next crisis. This risk is real, yet should be set aside by the central bank. In moments of crisis the central bank has to choose between two evils. The first one is an imminent collapse of the banking system; the other one is the evil of future moral hazard. A responsible central bank will always want to avoid the first evil.
While the lender of last resort operations of the ECB were necessary and helped to stabilize the government bond markets in the Eurozone, they were also ill designed. The bad design of these operations also explains why the ECB was forced to throw hundreds of billions of euros into the banking system, thereby dramatically increasing its balance sheet. (…).
Instead of intervening at the source of the problem (that is, the sovereign bond markets) the European Central Bank allowed the crisis to become a banking crisis. And when the latter effect emerged, ECB decided to delegate the power to buy government bonds to the banks, trusting that the latter would show the right judgment to buy these bonds. But the banks themselves were and are still in a state of fear and panic, and their judgment should not be trusted.
The unhappy decision of the ECB to delegate the decision to buy government bonds to panicky bankers has had two unfortunate consequences. The first consequence was that the banks channeled only a fraction of the liquidity they obtained from the ECB into the government bond markets. As a result, the ECB had to pour much more liquidity into the system than if it had decided to intervene itself in the government bond markets. As an example, if the banks used only half of the liquidity to buy government bonds, the ECB had to create two euros to make sure one euro would find its way into the sovereign bond market. This would be a very ineffective policy.
Secondly, and possibly even more important, as the liquidity support in the sovereign debt markets now depends on the judgment of bankers who have not yet liberated themselves from fear and panic, doubts continue to exist as to the continuing liquidity support that these bankers will provide. New waves of panic may grip the bankers again, leading them to massively sell government bonds. The risk that this may happen undermines the credibility of the whole operation, and can quickly lead to a new crisis in the government bond markets.
It is quite unfortunate that the ECB has delegated its lender of last resort duty to bankers who themselves are the slaves of market sentiments. In doing so, doubts continue to exist as to the stability of the sovereign debt markets in the Eurozone. These doubts can only go away when the ECB takes over the lead position and intervenes directly in the sovereign bond markets” (Fettdruck von mir).
Tja, so die zentralen Überlegungen von Paul De Grauwe, die ich halbwegs vernünftig finde und vor allem wäre dies jetzt wenigstens ein vielleicht gangbarer Weg, wenn die europäische Politik im Moment eindeutig blockiert ist.
In Deutschland ist im Moment ja sogar der kommende ESM blockiert, weil eine entsprechende Klage gegen den ESM beim Bundesverfassungsgerichts vorliegt und der aktuelle Präsident des Andreas Voßkuhle in dieser Sache auch noch mitmischen und sich mit der Entscheidung bis September Zeit lassen will. Soviel Zeit haben wir aber vielleicht nicht und es ergibt auch nicht viel Sinn, wenn Juristen über wichtige ökonomische Sachverhalte und Sachzwänge rumdiskutieren.
Trotz des eitlen Selbstlobs von Wolfgang Schäuble: Die Eurokrise ist massiv zurückgekehrt 80Klaus Gauger steht unter einer Creative Commons Namensnennung-NichtKommerziell-KeineBearbeitung 3.0 Unported Lizenz